Rabbi Jacob Zemah arrived in Constantinople on the last day of
March 1667. The rabbi was old and in poor health, and his
Constantinople colleagues had feared that he might not be able to
come; they had sent a summons to the great sage Avraham Amigo to
attend the disputation if Zemah could not. But he was there,
hale if somewhat worn from the journey, and he arrived to a warm
greeting from the Chief Rabbi and his entourage.
The selection of Zemah was a tactical maneuver on the part of the
rabbinate. Although Zemah did not have Rabbi Amigo's reputation
as a judge, he was still one of the great commentators of his
time. He was, specifically, a cabalist, whose writings on the
customs of Rabbi Isaac Luria would lay the groundwork for the
later Shulhan Arukh ha-Ari. [FN1]
A cabalist might seem a risky choice in the aftermath of Sabbatai
Zevi's apostasy, but the risk was a calculated one. Zemah, who
had been among the four Jerusalem rabbis to declare Zevi herem,
was one of the few scholars who had stood as strongly against
Zevi as had Spinoza himself. He was also that most practical of
men, a medical doctor, and had a keen logical mind. If Spinoza
chose to go on the offensive by attacking the Kabbalah itself,
Zemah was the one who could answer him.
Both Spinoza's party and the rabbis' passed the time before the
disputation as if nothing untoward was happening. The sole break
in the routine was Zemah's attendance at several of Spinoza's
lectures and prayer services, in order to gain an appreciation of
the man he would debate. The first time he attended, several of
Spinoza's more hotheaded followers attempted to remove him from
the hall, but Spinoza ordered them to let him stay.
Afterward, the onlookers asked Zemah his impression. His answer
was cryptic: "reason is one way to achieve the mitzvot. After
all, the Kabbalah is just another form of reason."
Further explanation of this statement, if there was to be any,
was left for the day of the disputation. That day - April 11,
1667 - dawned warm and clear. The debate had been slated to be
held at the Ahrida synagogue, but it soon became obvious that the
crowd of onlookers - not all Jewish by any means - would be too
big even for that great sanctuary. Thus, by general agreement,
the disputants moved to a nearby park in Eyp. Two high tables
were carried out to the park, and a chair placed on each; Spinoza
sat on one, and Zemah on the other. In the lore of
Constantinople and of Jews worldwide, the debate would be known
ever after as the "Day of the Tables."
By the rules agreed upon in advance, Spinoza as the challenged
party had a quarter of an hour to expound his theology, after
which he and Zemah would be free to argue. He spent this time in
a brief explanation of the philosophies he had developed through
years of thought. Although there was barely time to scratch the
surface, he managed to touch on the basic points: that God was
first cause and universal substance but without free will, that
every person had the capacity and desire to control his passions
and live a moral life, that God and the universe were knowable to
humans and could be discerned through rational processes. [FN2]
The dispute that followed lasted the entire day, and was
remembered by all who attended as a duel between two brilliant
minds. Almost from the beginning, it was clear that Zemah had
mastered Spinoza's philosophy and was ready to meet him on his
own ground. Early in the argument, for instance, he challenged
Spinoza's assertion that there was nothing in Scripture contrary
to human reason. Pointing out that Spinoza had described God as
a being without free will, Zemah asked how he could believe that
and still believe that the giving of the commandments at Mount
Sinai was not contrary to reason. If the Scriptures were true,
as Spinoza claimed to assert, then were they not proof that God
was an active agent with free will?
For a moment, Spinoza sat in silence absorbing this argument, and
some in the rabbinical party actually began to hope they had won.
Spinoza, however, was not one to give in so easily. He had not
been stymied; he simply needed time to consider his response -
and his answer, when he gave it, would become one of the
foundations of Rational Jewish theology.
The Scriptures, explained Spinoza, were divinely inspired, but
they were written by men, and their language reflects the
imperfect understanding of men rather than the true nature of
God. Although Moses may have believed that the commandments were
"given" to him by God, they in fact came from his intuitive
understanding of God's nature. His knowledge of God had focused
his reason and enabled him to discern the laws that would lead
humans to live morally. Thus, even though the Torah was not
divinely authored, it still stood as a testament to the greatness
of God and the prophets. How marvelous were the men who could
discern the mind of God, and how marvelous the God who had imbued
them with the power of discernment!
As proof of this assertion, Spinoza argued that every commandment
in the Torah could be discerned through logic and reason. The
prohibitions against pork and shellfish were sound, because these
were unhealthy foods. Daily prayer focused and disciplined the
mind. A woman's period of niddah [FN3] prevented disease,
stopped the flow of unhealthy humors, and constantly renewed her
husband's desire for her. And the sweet Sabbath was the most
logical mitzvah of all, because rest and contemplation were as
vital to human survival as the products of work.
In answer to another of Zemah's questions, Spinoza contended that
the stories of the prophets should be read for their moral truth
rather than their literal truth. The miracles of the prophets -
which Zemah cited as additional proof of God's role as an active
agent - did not in fact happen, but were valuable nevertheless
for the lessons that could be learned from them. The prophets,
like Moses, had an intuitive understanding of God, and reasoned
analysis of their works would reveal divine truths. [FN4]
The disputation went on in this vein for the rest of the day, and
ended with both sides believing they had won. Each party
evaluated the proof by a different standard; Spinoza's followers
believed that their champion's logical reasoning had bested
Zemah. In fact, Spinoza's secretary Haham Saltiel would later
publish an account of the proceedings under the title The
Triumph of Reason. On the other hand, the rabbinate argued
that Zemah had shown Spinoza's positions to be scripturally
unsound; to them, Spinoza's theory of prophecy sounded less like
a logical outgrowth of his philosophy than a desperate gambit.
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